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Movement and change enliven American culture. Nowhere is that 
more evident than in the labor market. But employers create a conflict 
between job mobility and retirement security when they cut future pen 
sion benefits for workers who quit a job before reaching retirement 
age. Presumably, employers do this to discourage workers from chang 
ing jobs.
Neither U.S. workers nor employers commit to a lifetime contract. 
After several early-career job changes, however, workers often do stay 
permanently with one employer. Once they reach age 40, one of two 
male and one of four female workers remain on the same job until 
retirement 20 to 25 years later (Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1990, p. 
34). Jobs with pensions promote even more job stability, especially for 
women.
Job change contributes to an efficient labor market, increasing mar 
ket flexibility and aiding economic growth and competitiveness. Pen 
sions, conversely, bind workers to jobs, and possibly allocate resources 
inefficiently. Employers, some argue, should be encouraged to restruc 
ture pension plans so that they no longer discourage workers from 
changing jobs. Need for such restructuring is heightened by the aging 
of the U.S. workforce, since job mobility declines as workers grow 
older.
Many employers favor little job change, however, preferring a sta 
ble workforce. Longevity is the benefit employers expect in exchange 
for their investment in worker skills. Workers do leave jobs, however. 
They quit for personal or family reasons, such as the relocation of a 
spouse or the need to care for a child or an elderly parent, or they are 
laid off frequently for reasons beyond their control.
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HISTORY OF U.S. PENSIONS
A brief history of pension coverage in the United States provides 
background for the discussion of pension portability. Private pension 
plans began during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 1 By 1930 
many large employers, including AT&T, General Electric, and DuPont, 
had pension plans. The number of plans stopped growing during the 
Depression, but resumed growth in the 1940s. From 1940 to 1972 pen 
sion coverage of full-time workers rose from 17 to 52 percent.
Pension coverage grew through 1970 due to union collective bar 
gaining in retail, construction, manufacturing, transportation, and min 
ing industries. In industries with many small unionized firms, 
multiemployer defined benefit plans administered jointly by a union 
and an employer-appointed board of trustees are the most common 
plan type. Large unionized firms typically have defined benefit plans, 
as well.
Since the early 1970s pension coverage has fallen slightly, and basic 
coverage has shifted from defined benefit toward defined contribution 
plans. Firms also increasingly have provided defined contribution 
plans to supplement benefits for workers already covered by a defined 
benefit plan.
Defined contribution plans covered one-third of the workers in plans 
started before 1975, but they have covered four-fifths of the workers in 
plans started after 1975. In 1975,78 percent of the participants in pen 
sion plans were in primary defined benefit plans. By 1989 that number 
had fallen to 64 percent, and a projection suggests that by 2000 the fig 
ure will have fallen to 51 percent (Hay/Huggins 1990a).
Pension coverage changes since the early 1970s have been due 
largely to changes in the labor force. Coverage remains high among 
large firms and among unionized firms. Such firms are employing a 
falling share of the labor force, however, and employment has grown 
rapidly in small nonunionized firms in service industries. Pension cov 
erage has always been low among workers in these firms.
The fastest growing industries from 1979 to 1988 were services and 
specifically finance, insurance, and real estate. Pension coverage rates 
also rose most rapidly in those groups: from 30 to 38 percent for ser 
vice industry workers, and from 54 to 59 percent for finance, insur-
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ance, and real estate workers. Those industry coverage gains offset 
somewhat a drop in workers employed in manufacturing, where cover 
age had been high. The large shift in jobs to the service sector, how 
ever, with its below-average coverage rate, depressed pension 
coverage rates.
PRIVATE PENSIONS AND JOB CHANGE
When private pensions were started in the late 1800s, firms used 
them to charitably retire older workers whose productivity was wan 
ing. The plans also helped maintain a loyal workforce. Firms fre 
quently did not provide pensions to "early leavers" workers leaving 
before retirement.
Expectations have changed. Workers now commonly view pensions 
as deferred pay that even short-tenure employees have a right to 
accrue. These expectations, plus concern about retirement income ade 
quacy, make pension benefit loss incurred by job leavers a public pol 
icy issue affecting the majority of the workforce. In 1988, 68 percent 
of males and 51 percent of females working full time were in a private 
pension plan in either their current or a past job. Of all full-time work 
ers with over 15 years on their current job, 78 percent had participated 
in a pension in a current or past job. Twenty-three percent of full-time 
workers age 45 to 54 had been in a pension plan on a prior job (Piacen- 
tini 1990b).
Worker myopia when changing jobs may cause low retirement 
income. Due to the growth of defined contribution plans, which com 
monly allow job leavers to cash out, employers frequently pay prere 
tirement lump sums to departing employees. In the late 1980s, 60 
percent of vested job leavers received at least partial lump sum cash- 
outs of their pension benefits. Fifty-one percent of vested job leavers 
received lump sum benefits for their entire pension (Piacentini 1990b).
Because so many job leavers cash out their pensions, some policy- 
makers argue that federal law on pension policy should lock-in pension 
benefits. When workers and employers do not react to this restriction 
by reducing the generosity of plans, locking-in pension benefits raises 
net savings in pensions. Higher savings via pensions not offset by a fall 
in other savings raise gross individual and national savings.
4 Job Mobility and Pension Portability
Because pensions often reward long tenure through various plan 
features, and because there is little or no portability, job leavers fre 
quently end up with lower benefits than job stayers, even when they do 
not cash out their pensions. Consider two workers with equal incomes 
through their careers. Worker A spends his/her career with one 
employer, while worker B changes employers several times. Worker A 
will receive a much larger pension than B, even if B's employers had 
pension plans identical to those of A. The benefits differ solely due to 
B having changed jobs.
PENSION REFORM FOR A MOBILE LABOR FORCE
Three labor market changes form the background against which 
pension reform is considered. First, intermittent workers have diffi 
culty accumulating adequate retirement income. With more women 
entering the workforce, federal retirement income policy is challenged 
by some women's small retirement incomes due to their discontinuous 
work histories. Also, workers in some industries have high job turn 
over, making it less likely that they will accumulate sufficient pension 
benefits to ensure adequate retirement income.
Second, social security expansion has ended, and a slight contrac 
tion is predicted. Social security is projected to pay less generous bene 
fits relative to earnings during the early part of the twenty-first century 
(Doescher and Turner 1988). This places pressure on private pensions 
and individual savings to raise retirement income in order to offset the 
contraction. Third, jobs have shifted to economic sectors having low 
pension coverage rates and relying less on defined benefit plans. These 
changes affect the options available to job leavers who are covered by 
a pension.
Defined Contribution and Defined Benefit Plans
To understand pension policy, one must understand the basic ways 
defined contribution and defined benefit plans differ. Defined contribu 
tion plans allocate employer contributions to individual accounts like 
savings or mutual funds accounts. Such plans require employers to 
contribute a fixed share of pay or allow employers to vary contribu-
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tions (as in a profit-sharing plan). Defined contribution plans may 
accept worker contributions, and often require them as a condition for 
matching employer contributions. Assets are typically pooled for 
investing. Investment gains and losses are allocated pro rata to worker 
accounts, and the worker bears the investment risk. In these plans, a 
worker's pension benefit at retirement equals the accumulated contri 
butions plus investment earnings and losses allocated to the account. 
The employer may pay the account balance to the worker as a lump 
sum, pay it out over a period of time, or use it to purchase an annuity 
paying benefits for a specified period, like 20 years, or for life.
Defined benefit plans promise a retirement benefit figured by a for 
mula, which usually includes earnings and tenure. The formula, for 
example, might be $20 a month times years of tenure with the 
employer, or it might be 1 percent of final salary times tenure. In 
defined benefit plans, the employer must make contributions figured 
by an actuary under government regulation sufficient to fund the 
promised benefits. When investment earnings fall short of promised 
benefits, the employer is financially responsible for the shortfall. Pen 
sion beneficiaries may share risk, however, by receiving smaller cost- 
of-living increases when the firm or the plan does poorly.
Effects of Benefit Loss from Job Change
When job leavers lose pension benefits they also lose tax benefits 
afforded by pensions. This raises questions about tax equity. Should 
tax benefits reward job tenure? Because long job tenure has been more 
common among men than women, does this policy discriminate 
against women?
Pension benefit loss deters workers from changing jobs or careers. 
The "golden handcuff effect may lower economic efficiency by pre 
venting workers from moving to their most productive job situation. 
This problem may be critical in declining industries that need to shrink 
but have tied workers to jobs by pensions. Similarly, if pensions have 
inhibited job change, they have hampered the labor market's ability to 
adjust.
Rather than worrying about golden handcuffs, however, some ana 
lysts are concerned about short job tenure. They argue that Japanese 
lifetime jobs encourage employers and workers to invest in worker
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productivity. Long tenure with an employer may be needed to recoup 
the investment from job-specific training. Thus, while both training 
and eliminating barriers to worker mobility are critical for fully using 
U.S. human resources, the goals conflict.
Pension Portability
Pension portability has been defined as the capacity to carry pension 
benefits from one job to the next. It has been closely linked to preserv 
ing vested benefits when a worker ends a job before retirement. The 
portability concept has recently been expanded to include accrued but 
unvested benefits. Of more importance, analysts have recognized that 
even when vested, job leavers' benefits erode in value due to inflation, 
reducing the real value of vested pension benefits; thus, the portability 
concept has expanded to mean preserving the real value of pension 
benefits when a worker ends a job before retirement. 2 Portability loss 
is the shortfall of actual retirement benefits from benefits that would 
have been paid had the worker not changed jobs.
Pension portability is achieved in three ways: through portability of 
benefits, service, or assets. Benefits are portable when the worker has a 
vested right to accrued benefits. With vesting, a worker changes jobs 
without losing nominal pension benefits, but the benefits can erode in 
real value due to inflation. Service is portable when years of service 
under a prior employer's plan count in figuring pension benefits with a 
new employer. Service portability is found in multiemployer plans, but 
also could be achieved by wage or price indexing the benefits of job 
leavers. These options reduce real benefit loss for workers changing 
jobs.
Pension assets are portable when the worker receives a cash distri 
bution of accrued benefits and rolls it over to an Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA) or another employer-provided pension plan. Asset port 
ability is commonly available in defined contribution plans, and is 
increasingly available in defined benefit plans. Asset portability is 
often called "preservation" because the rollover or interplan transfer 
preserves preretirement cashouts as retirement savings.
Corresponding to the three avenues to pension portability, there are 
three ways a job leaver may lose pension benefits. First, workers lose 
benefits by not having worked long enough to vest (deferred vesting).
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Second, workers lose benefits because plans offer lower benefits for 
workers who quit before retirement (design aspects of pension plans). 
This loss includes those cases where employers base cost-of-living 
adjustments on tenure. Third, workers lose benefits by treating the pen 
sion plan as severance pay rather than a retirement plan (consuming 
benefits before retirement). All three losses may be the result of a vol 
untary decision to change jobs or may be due to a layoff.
Legislative changes requiring vesting after five years for most work 
ers have reduced portability losses incurred from nonvesting. Approxi 
mately one-third of the remaining portability losses are due to other 
aspects of plan design, while two-thirds are due to workers cashing out 
benefits before they retire. Options for reducing portability losses due 
to plan design, on the one hand, and worker behavior, on the other, 
would distribute benefit costs differently. Plan design options could be 
expected to raise benefits accrued by short-term workers. Worker 
behavior options, by contrast, do not affect accrued benefits, but influ 
ence what workers do with these benefits.
Other countries have reduced pension portability losses more than 
the United States. Such policies include shorter vesting (Canada), a 
government or private clearinghouse for job leaver benefits (Nether 
lands, Japan), indexed benefits in defined benefit plans for workers 
quitting prior to retirement (United Kingdom), and a ban on lump sum 
payments to job leavers (Netherlands, Canada).
In 1972, Dan McGill wrote a book analyzing U.S. pension portabil 
ity and focusing largely on pension vesting. When McGill wrote, non- 
vesting caused a major share of portability losses. Since 1972, the U.S. 
pension system has changed dramatically. The Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) set minimum vesting standards 
which have since been tightened; now most workers vest within five 
years in a private pension plan.
Pension analysts have increasingly realized that vested workers lose 
benefits by changing jobs, however, and that those losses greatly 
reduce the benefit protection that vesting was thought to provide. 
Though pension portability has been an issue for many years, the 
remarkable changes in the U.S. pension system, the changes in the 
U.S. labor market, and better understanding of pension economics 
have raised the portability issues this book addresses.
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OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
This book analyzes what happens to the pension benefits of workers 
who quit or are laid off jobs. Presenting empirical evidence wherever 
possible, the book progresses from an overview to an informal analysis 
using simple logic and descriptive data, then proceeds to a more formal 
analysis using economic theory and econometric studies.
The first six chapters of the book describe why pension benefit 
losses are a significant problem and examines the number of workers 
affected and the amount of loss they incur. As background on quits and 
layoffs, chapter 2 portrays a labor market undergoing changes that 
often result in reductions in retirement benefits. Chapter 3 further 
describes job change by examining data on individual workers, and the 
particular impact of mobility on women's pension benefits. Job mobil 
ity often reduces future pension benefits, and chapter 4 investigates the 
size of these losses. Chapter 5 examines receipt and subsequent use of 
preretirement lump sum distributions, which constitute two-thirds of 
portability losses. Chapter 6 discusses issues concerning the pension 
benefits of laid-off workers.
Chapters 7 through 12 analyze possible policy responses to the pen 
sion benefit loss of job changers. Chapter 7 describes pension plan fea 
tures that already reduce portability losses. Chapter 8 debates the pros 
and cons of pension portability reform in five areas: equity, tax and 
budget policy, regulation, economic effects, and financial responsibil 
ity. Chapter 9 describes and evaluates policy options designed to 
reduce portability losses. Chapter 10 examines how policies mandating 
portability would affect employers and workers. It also surveys studies 
relating pensions and job change, because some portability policies 
may increase job change. Chapter 11 examines the role of layoffs in 
portability losses. Chapter 12 discusses policies towards pension porta 
bility in Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
These countries have pension systems similar to that of the United 
States, yet each has dealt differently with portability. Chapter 13 con 
cludes the book with a selective list of policies that would reduce the 
pension benefit losses of job changers.
Several issues related to pension portability have been omitted from 
the discussion. The first is greater pension coverage. While it would
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further a goal of portability to raise retirement benefits it is not 
itself a portability issue. The second is pension loss when a plan ends. 
Like the loss when a worker separates from an employer, some policies 
for dealing with those losses such as indexing benefits are the 
same. But as with coverage, considering these issues would greatly 
expand the book. The third issue is firm-initiated early retirement for 
older workers. Though not considered here, many pension issues for 
these older workers are the same as those for younger workers facing a 
layoff. The fourth omitted issue is pension portability in the public sec 
tor. The book deals only with the private sector, although public sector 
workers face similar pension issues.
NOTES
1. Much of the discussion of pension coverage is based on Beller and Lawrence (1992).
2. Some analysts define portability more narrowly, distinguishing the ability to transfer benefit 
rights between jobs from the preservation of real vested benefit rights with a former employer.
